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A number of noteworthy partnership cases were decided during this
year's survey period. In addition, the Texas Revised Limited Part-
nership Act' and the Texas Uniform Partnership Act2 were
amended, the latter to introduce a new type of partnership - the registered
limited liability partnership.3 For the reader's convenience, the authors
grouped the cases under topical headings corresponding to the most impor-
tant partnership law aspect of the case.
I. CASES
A. Liability of Individual Partners For Partnership Obligations
The cases in this section exemplify, in very different contexts, the general
rule that general partners of a partnership have joint and several liability for
the debts and obligations of the partnership.
1. Carlyle Joint Venture v. H B. Zachry Company4
In Carlyle the court considered whether joint venture partners were indi-
vidually liable for an arbitration award entered against the joint venture in
an arbitration proceeding in which the partners were not parties and did not
participate. 5 The joint venture and a contractor entered into a construction
contract that required disputes between the parties to be resolved by arbitra-
tion. Accordingly, when a dispute later arose, the controversy was submit-
ted to arbitration and an award was made in favor of the contractor against
the joint venture. The contractor then sued on the arbitration award and
obtained a state district court judgment confirming the award against the
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, San Antonio, Texas.
** B.S., University of Texas at Arlington; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, Ft. Worth, Texas.
1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 (Vernon 1970 and Vernon Supp. 1992)
[hereinafter TRLPA].
2. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970 and Vernon Supp. 1992) [here-
after TUPA].
3. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 2, 15, 45-A, 45-B, 45-C (Vernon Supp.
1992).
4. 802 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
5. The joint venture partners were not served or otherwise joined in the arbitration pro-
ceeding. The court viewed the issue of the partners' individual liability in this context as one of
"first impression." Id. at 815.
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joint venture.6 In addition, the trial court granted summary judgment in the
amount of the award against the joint venture partners, individually and
severally. 7
The partners appealed, challenging the judgment against them individu-
ally on the ground that they were not parties to the arbitration proceeding.
The court rejected their argument and held as a matter of law that "when
the joint venture is a party to an arbitration proceeding which results in an
award against the joint venture, individual partners of the joint venture are
individually and severally liable for the award as a debt and obligation of the
joint venture under the law of partnerships. " The court noted that because
a joint venture is so similar in nature to a partnership, 9 partnership law ap-
plies to joint ventures1° and, therefore, joint venture partners are jointly and
severally liable for all debts and obligations of the joint venture. I1 In this
case those debts and obligations included the arbitration award judicially
confirmed by the trial court against the joint venture. 12
2. Nance v. Resolution Trust Corporation 13
In this lender liability suit,14 the court determined the extent of the gen-
eral partner's liability under partnership law for a debt of a limited partner-
ship.' 5 The general partner's appeal from a trial court judgment for the
6. Suit was filed pursuant to the Texas General Arbitration Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. arts. 224-49 (Vernon 1973 and Vernon Supp. 1990). 802 S.W.2d at 815.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 816. The stakes were the personal assets of the individual venturers. Although
they are entitled to be indemnified by the partnership under TUPA § 18(l)(b), that would be a
hollow right if the joint venture had few or no assets.
9. "The elements of a joint venture are: (1) mutual right of control; (2) community of
interest; (3) agreement to share profits as principals; and (4) agreement to share losses, costs, or
expenses." Id. at 816 n.2 (citing Coastal Plains Development Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., 572
S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. 1978)).
10. 802 S.W.2d at 816. This is settled Texas law. See, Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934,
937 (Tex. 1988) (applying partnership law of joint and several liability).
11. 802 S.W.2d at 816; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (Vernon Supp.
1992).
12. 802 S.W.2d at 816. The result would probably have been different if the plaintiff had
sought to enforce the arbitration award directly against the assets of the joint venture partners
without having a judgment against the partners, even if the plaintiff had a judgment confirming
the arbitration award against the joint venture. TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES
CODE § 17.022, entitled "Service on Partnership," reads: "Citation served on one member of a
partnership authorizes a judgment against the partnership and the partner actually served."
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.022 (Vernon 1986) (emphasis added). See the discussion
of two cases on a similar legal issue in last year's survey, Steven A. Waters & Joni Gaylor,
Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 SW. L.J. 553, 554 n.7 and 566, nn.107-08.
13. 803 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990), writ denied per curiam, 813 S.W.2d
154 (Tex. 1991).
14. The claim involved a fairly straightforward "breach of commitment to lend," with a
request for lost profits, and not the more typical lender liability claims of bad faith, fraud,
deceptive trade practices, etc.
15. The court cited to TRLPA, which became effective on September 1, 1987, but which
applies to pre-existing partnerships before September 1, 1992, only if those partnerships amend
their agreements to affirmatively adopt TRLPA. The limited partnership here was formed in
1983 and nothing in the opinion suggests that the partnership acted to adopt TRLPA. The
result would have been the same, however, under the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
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lender non obstante veredicto was based on the terms of a guaranty agree-
ment. The general partner in Nance urged that, although normally he would
be liable under partnership law for all debts of the limited partnership, 16 his
liability here for the deficiency balance owed on a loan made to the limited
partnership was limited, as a matter of law, to fifty percent of the deficiency
because he had executed a guaranty agreement limiting his liability to fifty
percent of the amount due on that loan. 17 The court rejected this argument,
found that the guaranty agreement by its terms provided a totally independ-
ent basis of liability from that imposed by law on a general partner, and held
that Nance was separately liable as a general partner for all debts of the
partnership.18 Thus, Nance's liability as a general partner was found to be
totally independent of, and in this case greater than, his liability as a
guarantor. 19
3. Martin v. First RepublicBank, Fort Worth, N.S. 20
Martin confirms that partners have direct liability for partnership debts.
In Martin the bank sued the joint venture partners to recover amounts due
under promissory notes executed by the joint venture. The court rejected
the partners' argument that they were liable only for unpaid deficiency
amounts remaining after collection efforts against the joint venture were ex-
hausted, and held that, under Texas partnership law, 21 joint venture partners
are jointly and severally liable for promissory notes executed by the joint
venture22 and that they may be sued directly on joint venture debts, sepa-
rately from the joint venture.23 The court noted further that these joint
venture partners were also directly liable individually under separate guaran-
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 10(a) (Vernon 1970), and TUPA § 15, which the
court properly cited. 803 S.W.2d at 334.
16. TUPA § 15 makes each general partner jointly and severally liable for the debts and
obligations of the partnership. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 6132b, § 15 (Vernon Supp.
1992).
17. In addition to asking the court to find as a matter of law that his liability was limited
to fifty percent by virtue of the guaranty, Nance asked in the alternative for a jury question on
the issue. Although it is not unusual for a general partner to be required to sign a guaranty
(e.g., because a general partner's liability under TUPA § 15 is in some respects derivative of
the partnership's liability, there are occasions, such as when the debt of the partnership is or
becomes non-recourse, where the guaranty imposes liability when general partner status would
not), the facial inconsistency here suggests that Nance had a point. The court apparently
disagreed.
18. 803 S.W.2d at 334.
19. Id. Effectively, the court found that the statement in the guaranty that the guaran-
tor's obligations were independent of the borrower's (and, therefore, its partners') meant that
the general partner/guarantor's liability was the greater of that imposed by the two statuses.
20. 799 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
21. The court observed that "[a] joint venture is a legal entity 'in the nature of a partner-
ship.'" (quoting Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704, 709 (1956)). Id. at 487. The
court also analyzed the partner's position under Texas partnership law.
22. 799 S.W.2d at 487 (citing McGhee v. Wynnewood State Bank, 297 S.W.2d 876, 883
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
23. 799 S.W.2d at 487 (citing 297 S.W.2d at 883); see also Foster v. Daon Corp., 713 F.2d




ties executed by them.24
B. Form Of Contribution To A Partnership
1. Cooke v. Dykstra25
The issues in Cooke were whether limited partners, who became obligated
as guarantors, agreed to contribute capital to the limited partnership in the
amount guaranteed and whether withdrawing those guaranties created lia-
bility for breach of the limited partnership agreement. In Cooke each of two
limited partners executed a separate $25,000 guaranty agreement, collec-
tively guaranteeing payment of a $50,000 line of credit established for the
benefit of the limited partnership.26 The general partner sued the limited
partners for breach of the limited partnership agreement after he was denied
access to the $50,000 line of credit the limited partners had guaranteed and
after the limited partners "attempted to terminate the partnership. '27 The
general partner received a jury award of actual damages of $120,000,2 s but it
cannot be determined from the opinion how those damages were computed.
Apparently, one is left to infer that the damages resulted from the adverse
effect on the partnership's exporting business of the inability to draw on the
line of credit and that the limited partners' actions, perhaps revoking their
guaranties, rendered the line of credit inaccessible. 29
Section 9.01 of the limited partnership agreement provided that "[t]he lia-
bility of the Limited Partners with regard to the Partnership in all respects is
restricted and limited to the amount of the actual capital contributions that
they make or agree to make to the Partnership."' 30 Based on this provision,
the limited partners' theory on appeal was that they had not made a contri-
24. 799 S.W.2d at 486 (citing Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874,
877 (Tex. 1976)).
25. 800 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
26. The description in the opinion of the guaranty agreements and loan relationships is
confusing, and the statement in the text is an interpolation. It is unclear from the opinion
whether the limited partners (i) executed a guaranty directly to the partnership or (ii) executed
a guaranty in favor of the third party lender who made the $50,000 line of credit available, or
both, and if only in favor of the lender, whether the partnership agreement itself referred to a
limited partner guaranty obligation. For example, each of the following statements is made in
the opinion: (1) "As their contribution to the partnership, appellants executed guaranty agree-
ments to American Trade Company ("the partnership") in the amount of $25,000 each." Id. at
558; (2) "Appellants executed guaranty agreements to First City Bank Clear Lake, guarantee-
ing a $50,000 line of credit for American Trade Co." Id. at 559; (3) "By guaranteeing a
$25,000 line of credit for the partnership, each appellant contributed or agreed to contribute
$25,000 to the limited partnership." Id.; and (4) "The partnership agreement limits appellants'
liability to the amount of their contributions. Each limited partner contributed $25,000 in the
way of a guaranty agreement on a line of credit at First City National Bank Clear Lake;
therefore, the liability of each appellant is limited to $25,000." Id.
27. Id. at 561. What the limited partners actually did and whether their actions were in
any way dealt with by the partnership agreement is not stated in the opinion. See infra note
54, regarding "termination" versus "dissolution" of a partnership.
28. Id. at 558. The jury also awarded the general partner attorney's fees, but that award
was reversed by the court for evidentiary reasons. Id.
29. Id. One must also assume that the general partner's claim was for "his share" of the
partnerhip's profits that were lost as a result of the limited partners' breach.
30. Id. at 559.
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bution to the partnership and, therefore, had no liability.31 The court dis-
agreed and found that the limited partners' guarantees of the partnership's
line of credit were contributions, or agreements to contribute, to the partner-
ship.32 The court pointed to Section 5 of the Texas Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act,33 which limits the permitted form of contributions by a limited
partner to either cash or other property, and apparently characterized the
guaranties as agreements to contribute cash.34 The court, however, reduced
the damage award from $120,000 to $50,000, limited to $25,000 against each
limited partner to equal the maximum liability of each under the partnership
agreement. 3"
C. Breach Of A Partner's Fiduciary Duty
The cases discussed in this section underscore the potential consequences,
including suffering exemplary damages, of a partner's failure to observe the
fiduciary duty owed by one partner to another.
1. Cheek v. Humphreys36
The partnership law issues in Cheek involve the prerequisites to imposing
exemplary damages for breach of a partner's fiduciary duty, how to compute
lost profits caused by breach of a partnership agreement, and the method of
valuing partnership assets on dissolution. In Cheek the plaintiff and the de-
fendant orally formed a partnership to conduct a business to buy, package,
and sell onions. The partnership purchased equipment, leased and moved
into a building, and began business operations. Within the next two years,
the defendant moved the partnership equipment without the plaintiff's con-
sent to the defendant's mother's business location, first locally and then to
another city, transferred partnership funds into a different account, and
changed the partnership's telephone number to that of his mother's business.
Furthermore, the defendant denied the plaintiff access to the partnership
books and failed after demand by the plaintiff to provide information regard-
ing partnership matters.3 7 The plaintiff sued for breach of the partnership
31. The guaranty agreements were the only evidence presented of the limited partners'
contribution to the partnership. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 5 (Vernon 1970) [hereinafter TULPA].
34. A better or more complete analysis, perhaps, is that failing to maintain the guaranties
in place (if that in fact is what happened) constituted a breach of TULPA § 18, which provides
that a limited partner is liable to the partnership for the difference between his actual contribu-
tion and the contribution stated in the certificate as having been made. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132a, § 18 (Vernon 1970).
35. 800 S.W.2d at 559. Or was the limitation in the guaranties?
36. 800 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
37. Although not cited in the case, it appears that the plaintiff obtained jury issues and
findings under TUPA § 20 ("Partners shall render on demand true and full information of all
things affecting the partnership to any partner) and TUPA § 21(1) ("Every partner must ac-
count to the partnership for any benefit ... derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the ... conduct ... of the partnership or from




agreement and breach of fiduciary duty and was awarded actual and exem-
plary damages. 38
The appellate court began its exemplary damages analysis by noting that
partners owe a fiduciary duty to each other.39 According to the court, the
key inquiry in determining the propriety of exemplary damages for breach of
that fiduciary duty was whether the fiduciary "intended to gain an additional
benefit for himself," not whether there was an intent to injure.40 Therefore,
exemplary damages were found to be proper where a fiduciary participated
in self-dealing.41 The court also stated that a showing of malice or ill will
supports an award of exemplary damages. 42 In this case, as an apparently
independent basis for affirming the trial court's award of exemplary dam-
ages, the court pointed both to the defendant's self-dealing actions and to his
several intentional acts of misconduct and concluded that sufficient evidence
existed to support the trial court's finding of malice. 43
On a second point, the court also affirmed the trial court's award to the
plaintiff of damages for lost profits caused by the defendant's breach of the
partnership agreement. Without expressly so stating, the court apparently
equated profits lost because of a breach of the agreement with post-dissolu-
tion profits.44 The court concluded that the plaintiff's testimony that the
defendant's post-breach profits of $294,811.23 to $491,352.05 would have
been profits of the partnership, in which the plaintiff would share, was suffi-
cient evidence to support the trial court's award to the plaintiff of $9,827.41
damages.45
On the third issue, the proper basis for valuing partnership equipment on
38. 800 S.W.2d at 597.
39. Id. at 599 (citing Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962)).
40. 800 S.W.2d at 599 (citing International Bankers Life Ins. Company v. Holloway, 368
S.W.2d 567, 583-84 (Tex. 1963)).
41. 800 S.W.2d at 599 (citing Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 510
(Tex. 1980)). Indeed, the duty of loyalty is a key element of a partner's fiduciary duty to other
partners, evidenced in the statute in TUPA § 21. See supra note 37.
42. 800 S.W.2d at 599 (citing Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266 (1851)). "Malice" has been
defined as "ill-will, spite, evil motive, or purposing the injuring of another." Clements v. With-
ers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1969).
43. 800 S.W.2d at 599.
44. As the court noted, absent a contrary agreement each partner shares equally the prof-
its and surplus remaining after liabilities are satisfied. See TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b, § 18(l)(a) (Vernon 1970). This is the distributable "net" left after assets are sold and
creditors are paid. A partner must, however, establish his right to post-dissolution profits. 800
S.W.2d at 599 (citing Taormina v. Culicchia, 355 S.W.2d 569, 576 (Tex. Civ. App. -El Paso
1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The court never returned to the issue of plaintiff's "right" to profits.
45. 800 S.W.2d at 599. The court's discussion of the lost profits issue is entirely unsatisfy-
ing. On the one hand, the plaintiff sued for a dissolution of the partnership, presumably under
TUPA § 32(l)(d) (judicial dissolution available when a partner wilfully or persistently
breaches the partnership agreement or engages in conduct relating to the partnership that
makes him an unsuitable business partner). The court never said, however, whether dissolu-
tion was granted by the trial court. In addition, the court's discussion seems almost to assume
that dissolution occurred earlier (e.g., when the defendant usurped the partnership opportu-
nity) and that the court considered the plaintiff to be a retiring partner under TUPA § 42 and
was analyzing the plaintiff's position under that section. TUPA § 42 allows certain former
partners who are not continuing in the partnership to receive the value of their interest at
dissolution plus, at their option, either interest on that value or profits attributable to the use of
2016 [Vol. 45
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dissolution, the court found that the lower court erred in using book
value. 46 The court felt that book value was too arbitrary.47 Implying that
market value is the proper measure of value of partnership assets on dissolu-
tion, the court held that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof to
show market value48 and remanded the equipment valuation issue to the
trial court for a new trial.49
2. Murphy v. Canion50
Murphy involved an action for breach of partnership agreement and
breach of fiduciary duty relating to the usurpation by one partner of partner-
ship business opportunities. In Murphy the plaintiff and the defendant
formed a partnership to conduct real estate business. A key provision in
their written partnership agreement stated that: "[b]oth partners agree to
devote their full-time efforts to the conducting of partnership business and
agree that all personal earnings from personal services shall be included as
partnership income." 51 The court interpreted this provision to mean that
any real estate business conducted by the partners during the term of the
partnership was for the benefit of the partnership. 52
Without advising the plaintiff, the defendant became involved in four real
estate transactions during the term of the partnership, in two of which he
used partnership funds. The defendant personally profited from each of
these secret transactions,5 3 to the exclusion of the partnership. Some of the
transactions originated during the term of the partnership but were consum-
mated after termination of the partnership, 54 which was initiated by the de-
that value in the partnership's business. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 42 (Vernon
1970).
A simpler analysis that appears to fit the facts could base the damage award either on (1)
actual damages from breach of a partnership agreement to share profits equally (which is con-
sistent with the plaintiff's testimony) or (2) a claim for actual damages for breach of fiduciary
duty under TUPA § 21(1), which requires the breaching partner to hold ill-gotten gains in
trust for the partnership. TEX REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 21(1) (Vernon 1970).
Interestingly, the plaintiff did not challenge the award amount of $9,827.41, which repre-
sented only approximately two to three percent of the plaintiff's own estimate of profits lost.
46. 800 S.W.2d at 598.
47. Id. (citing Johnson v. Braden, 286 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1956, no writ).
48. 800 S.W.2d at 598. The plaintiff testified that the book value of the equipment was
$17,896.69, which was significantly greater than the defendant's market valuation of the equip-
ment at between $1,500 and $2,000. Id.
49. Id. at 600.
50. 797 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
51. Id. at 945.
52. Id. at 945-46. It would be impossible to spend all of one's time conducting partner-
ship real estate activities and engage in separate, personal real estate deals "on the side."
53. The defendant went to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the transactions were hid-
den from the plaintiff, including using a "straw man" to acquire title to property. Id. at 946.
54. It is difficult to determine from the opinion whether either the parties or the court
used the word "termination" correctly. Neither misuse is uncommon. TUPA § 29 defines
dissolution and TUPA § 30 makes clear that dissolution, winding up and termination are dif-
ferent steps in the life of a partnership, chronologically in that order. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 29, 30 (Vernon 1970); see infra note 61.
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fendant after the plaintiff's discovery of the defendant's activities. 55 The
jury agreed with the plaintiff's claim that the defendant breached the part-
nership agreement and his fiduciary duty and awarded the plaintiff actual
and exemplary damages, but the actual damage award was offset by almost
one-half to compensate the defendant for his efforts in producing the
profits. 56
The appellate court disagreed with the lower court's allowance of an offset
against the actual damage award for the value of the defendant's services,
which the court viewed as a recovery by the defendant in quantum meruit.57
In reversing the trial court on the offset issue, the appellate court held that
the defendant's misconduct prevented him from having the "clean hands"
necessary to recover under the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit. 58 The
court also held that a partner who breaches a partnership agreement cannot
recover in quantum meruit from his partners.5 9
The court next considered whether the defendant's breach of fiduciary
duty caused the plaintiff's actual damages. The court easily found sufficient
evidence to support the jury's conclusion that, effectively, if the defendant
had not breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by excluding the plaintiff
from the four real estate transactions, then the plaintiff would have been
entitled to one-half of the profits ultimately earned by the defendant from
those transactions. 6° In sustaining the jury award to the plaintiff of actual
damages in that amount, the court expressly rejected the defendant's theory
that because the defendant received the profits from the secret transactions
after dissolution of the partnership 6' the damages were not proximately
caused by the defendant's breach of fiduciary duty.62
Finally, the court held that it was proper to impose exemplary damages
for the defendant's breach of fiduciary duty.63 As in Cheek v. Humphreys,
55. The court referred to a provision in the partnership agreement allowing "termination"
by a partner with 90 days' notice. 797 S.W.2d at 946. Again, it appears that "termination"
may have been confused with "dissolution," which is an event to be followed by winding up
(i.e. liquidation of assets) and then termination. Nevertheless, the court appears to act on the
basis that the partnership terminated 90 days after defendant gave his notice.
56. Id. at 947.
57. Id. "The equitable doctrine of quantum meruit is based on the principle that one
receiving benefits that are unjust for him to retain should make restitution or pay the value of
the benefit to the party contributing the benefit." Id. (citing Baldwin v. Smith, 586 S.W.2d
624, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 611 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980)).
The defendant did not use the term "quantum meruit." See infra note 59.
58. 797 S.W.2d at 947 (citing Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1988)).
59. Id. The court found no legal basis for and rejected the defendant's assertion that he
had plead for an offset or recoupment rather than quantum meruit. Id.
60. Id. at 949.
61. Id. at 948. At this point in the opinion, the court referred to the defendant's argument
that he received funds after "dissolution", not "termination." Again, inconsistent use of the
two terms is confusing, but not unusual. See supra note 55.
62. 797 S.W.2d at 948. In the face of the overwhelming evidence of his improper actions,
the defendant did not challenge the finding of breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
63. Id. at 949. Though not directly invoked by the court at this point in the opinion, the
court's earlier quote of Justice Cardozo on the standard of conduct for fiduciaries is indicative
of the court's strong feelings about breach of fiduciary duty:
[C]opartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the
2018 [Vol. 45
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decided by the same court several months later,64 the court keyed on
whether the defendant acted intentionally65 and implied that an act of self-
dealing was necessarily intentional. 66 The court concluded that the jury's
finding that the defendant wilfully and intentionally breached his fiduciary
duty supported an award of exemplary damages.67
D. Creation Of A Partnership
Partnerships are not always formed by written agreements drafted by
knowledgeable counsel, beginning "The parties hereby form a partnership."
If the statutory criteria set forth in TUPA section 7 are met, a partnership
may exist when one party or the other least expects it. The cases in this
section illustrate, however, that allegations of that nature are not always
successful.
1. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation v. Griffin 68
The court in Griffin analyzed whether a partnership existed among a
bank, a joint venture, and the joint venture partners, individually, in connec-
tion with a loan made by the bank to the joint venture, and guaranteed by
the joint venture partners. In the bank's suit against the defendant joint
venture partner to recover a deficiency due on the loan, 69 the defendant as-
serted breach of partnership duties by the bank as an affirmative defense.
The defendant theorized that the loan documents established that a partner-
ship had been formed among the bank, the joint venture, and the individual
joint venture partners. The trial court rejected the defendant's affirmative
defense and found him liable under the guaranty. 70
After reviewing the loan documents executed by the parties, the court of
appeals held that the parties clearly lacked the requisite intent, which the
finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the stan-
dard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of eq-
uity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disinte-
grating erosion' of particular exceptions. [Citation omitted] Only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by
the crowd.
Id. at 948 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928)).
64. See supra text and accompanying notes 36-49.
65. 797 S.W.2d at 949.
66. Id. "Exemplary damages are proper where, as in this case, a fiduciary has engaged in
self-dealing." Id. (citing Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 510 (Tex. 1980)).
67. 797 S.W.2d at 949.
68. 935 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3420 (U.S. Dec. 10,
1991) (No. 91-809). In addition to the partnership issues discussed here, the case contains
important discussions of usury and guaranty law issues.
69. Initially, the suit was on the guaranty for the full amount of the indebtedness,
prompted because a direct action against the debtor joint venture was stayed by the joint
venture's federal bankruptcy filing. After the stay was lifted, the lender foreclosed and the suit
continued for the amount of the deficiency remaining after foreclosure. Id. at 694.
70. Id. at 695.
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court considered the key element, to form a partnership. 7 1 The court ac-
knowledged that a statement in a written agreement that no partnership is
formed between the parties to that agreement is not necessarily conclusive of
the issue. The court believed, however, that in this case the combination of
(i) the inference from the loan documents that no partnership was created,72
(ii) the absence of an agreement between the parties to share losses,73 and
(iii) the statutory rebuttal of the presumption of partnership from a profit-
sharing arrangement when that arrangement is in the context of a loan trans-
action 74 clearly reflected the parties' intent here not to become partners.75
2. Murphy v. McDermott, Inc. 76
The partnership issue examined in Murphy concerned the existence of a
partnership. The plaintiff in this case sued a marine contractor for breach of
an oral agreement to pay commissions to the plaintiff arising from the
purchase by the contractor of marine vessels. The trial court granted the
contractor's cross-motion for summary judgment on grounds that included
an affirmative defense that all claims against the contractor had been re-
leased. 77 The release in question was signed by a third party with whom the
plaintiff had orally agreed to share the commissions from the sale to the
defendant contractor.
On appeal, the court rejected the contractor's contention that the release
was given by the third party on behalf of a partnership between the plaintiff
and the third party. 78 Relying on TUPA section 7(3),79 which states that
"sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership," the court
found that the agreement between the plaintiff and the third party to share
commissions did not establish a partnership.80 The court also found that the
third party's referral to the plaintiff as his partner did not, alone, create a
partnership. 8'
71. Id. at 700 (citing Voudouris v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 560 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ)).
72. 935 F.2d at 699-700.
73. Id. (citing Gutierrez v. Yancey, 650 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983,
no writ)); see also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (partners
have joint and several liability for partnership obligations). The court rejected the defendant's
"highly imaginative" assertion that the bank agreed to share in seventy-five percent of the joint
venture's losses because the defendant's liability under his guaranty was limited to twenty-five
percent of the indebtedness owed on the joint venture loan. 935 F.2d at 699. An agreement to
share in losses of a business is not created by limiting the liability of a guarantor. Id.
74. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 7 (Vernon 1970). Section 7 provides that in
determining the existence of a partnership the "receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall
be drawn if such profits were received in payment . . . [a]s interest on a loan, though the
amount of payment vary with the profits of the business." Id.
75. 935 F.2d at 700.
76. 807 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
77. Id. at 608.
78. Id. at 613.
79. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 7(3) (Vernon 1970).
80. 807 S.W.2d at 613.
81. Id. The court found the third party's statement that he and the defendant were part-
ners to be the statement of a legal conclusion on an issue of disputed fact (i.e., the existence of a
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E. Accounting And Characterization Of Partnership Assets
1. Biggs v. First National Bank of Lubbock 8 2
The three primary partnership topics discussed by the court in Biggs are:
(1) the requirement of an accounting between partners as a condition prece-
dent to a suit by one partner against another involving the partnership busi-
ness; (2) the propriety of a unilateral judicial partition of partnership
property; and (3) the accrual of prejudgment interest before completion of
an accounting establishing an amount owed by one partner to another part-
ner. Responding to one partner's claim that an accounting first must be
rendered by the court, the court acknowledged the general rule that an ac-
counting and settlement is required before one partner can sue another over
claims arising out of the partnership business.8 3 The court concluded, how-
ever, that the jury charge, taken as a whole,8 4 effectively asked the jury to
render an accounting between the partners. 85 In a later, unexplained contra-
diction, the court overruled the trial court's finding of damages for breach of
fiduciary duty arising from the retention by one partner of partnership as-
sets, on the basis that the requisite accounting had not been rendered.8 6
The court also examined whether the trial court, after having determined
that a particular tract of land was in fact partnership property,8 7 could
award ownership of that property to one partner individually. The appellate
court viewed such an award as effecting a partition that could not properly
be made without either suitable pleadings or an agreement of the parties.88
The court reversed and rendered the trial court's award of prejudgment
interest. The court took the view that prejudgment interest cannot be
awarded until there has been an accounting to determine the amount owed
by one partner to another.8 9 As an exception to this general rule, prejudg-
ment interest is allowed before an accounting is completed where the ac-
counting has been hindered by the fraud or misconduct of a partner.9°
II. STATUTORY CHANGES
The Texas legislature amended both the TUPA and the TRLPA during
partnership) which was insufficient to sustain a summary judgment in light of defendant's
affidavit that he did not authorize a release of the commission. Id.
82. 808 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
83. Id. at 236 (citing Kartalis v. Commander Warehouse Joint Venture, 773 S.W.2d 393,
394 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
84. The charge "required [the jury] to consider all of the testimony and evidence
presented and to reach a determination that would compensate [a partner's] estate to the
extent of his partnership interest in the funds and assets which had come into [the other part-
ner's] possession and for which he had failed to report and account." 808 S.W.2d at 236.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 238.
87. The fact that legal title was in the name of only one partner was correctly held not to
be determinative. Id. at 237.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 238 (citing Conrad v. Judson, 465 S.W.2d 819, 830 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
90. 808 S.W.2d at 238. No such delay was found here.
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the survey period. 91 The changes to TUPA are particularly significant.
A. Registered Limited Liability Partnership
Sections 83, 84, 85 and 86 of the Omnibus Business Association Act of
May 20, 1991,92 amended sections 2 and 15 of, and added new sections 45-A
through 45-C to, the Texas Uniform Partnership Act to create a new type of
entity, the registered limited liability partnership. 93 This type of entity is
allowed by the amendment of TUPA section 15, which created a new para-
graph (2). 94 While partners in an ordinary general partnership are jointly
and severally liable for all debts and obligations of the partnership, 95 a part-
ner in a registered limited liability partnership is not individually liable for
debts and obligations that arise from "errors, omissions, negligence, incom-
petence, or malfeasance committed in the course of the partnership business
by another partner or representative of the partnership not working under
the supervision or direction of the first partner at the time the errors, omis-
sions, negligence, incompetence or malfeasance occurred, unless the first
partner... was directly involved in the specific activity" or had notice or
knowledge of the events that created the liability at the time of their occur-
rence.96 It is expected that many professional service organizations, includ-
ing law firms, accounting firms, and engineering firms, will choose to register
to become registered limited liability partnerships. New paragraphs (3) and
(4) added to TUPA section 15 make clear that a partner in a registered lim-
ited liability partnership remains liable for other partnership debts and obli-
gations and that the liability of the partnership assets for the partnership's
debts and obligations is unaffected by paragraph (2). 9 7
New sections 45-A, 45-B and 45-C contain the procedural requirements
for creating a limited liability partnership. These requirements include the
registration requirements, requirements regarding the name of the partner-
ship, and minimum professional liability insurance requirements.9"
B. Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act Amendments
Sections 55 through 78 of the Act of May 20, 1991, contain amendments
to the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act.99 Some of the more notable
changes are described below.
91. Act of May 20, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 901, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3161
(Vernon).
92. Id.
93. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 2, 15, 45A-C (Vernon Supp. 1992).




98. Id. §§ 45A-C.





Section 2.02 was amended to add a subsection (f). This subsection allows
a limited partnership to have a non-partner liquidator after dissolution. It
also provides that the liquidator will not have the liability of a general part-
ner by virtue of being the liquidator. 1°°
2. Certificate
A number of changes were made to the certificate requirements contained
in section 2.04. One change is that a certificate of amendment need not be
signed by a withdrawing general partner. Other changes are that a certifi-
cate of cancellation must be signed by all general partners participating in
the winding up of the limited partnership's affairs or by the non-partner liq-
uidators if no general partners are so participating and that a certificate of
correction must be signed by at least one general partner. 10 1
3. Mergers and Interest Exchanges
Section 2.11, dealing with mergers between Texas limited partnerships
and other Texas and U.S. limited partnerships, has been substantially rewrit-
ten to, among other things, state in greater detail what must be contained in
a plan of merger and to state things that may be contained in the plan of
merger. 102 Significantly, a new section (h) has been added to allow a Texas
limited partnership to combine with other types of entities, including corpo-
rations, general partnerships, and joint stock companies, through an "inter-
est exchange" pursuant to which the Texas limited partnership interests are
exchanged for cash or securities, or both, of the acquiring entity.10 3 The
Texas statute still requires that the limited partnership agreement of the
Texas limited partnership contain authorizing language for a merger or an
interest exchange. 1 4
4. Delayed Effectiveness of Certain Filings
A new section 2.12 was added to allow the effectiveness of certain docu-
ments to be as of a time and date after the time and date otherwise provided
by the TRLPA. These documents include amendments or restatements of
certificates, mergers, registrations or cancellations regarding foreign limited
partnerships, and changes in the registered office or registered agent. 10 5
5. Procedure to Correct Inaccurate or Defective Instruments
A new section 2.13 has been added to allow a certificate of correction to be
filed to correct inaccuracies contained in any instrument authorized by the
100. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 2.02(0 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
101. Id. § 2.04.
102. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 2.11 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 2.12.
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TRLPA to be filed with the secretary of state.'°6
6. Safe Harbor Provisions
Minor changes were made to section 3.03(b), which contains the so-called
"safe harbor" powers. These powers may be possessed or exercised by a
limited partner without making the limited partner liable as a general part-
ner.'07 These rights now include settling or terminating a derivative action
and proposing, approving or disapproving (i) an election to reconstitute the
limited partnership or continue its business or (ii) a merger of a limited
partnership. 10 8
7. Provision for Creditors on Winding Up
Section 8.05 was amended to change the limited partnership option on
winding up of either paying creditors or establishing a reserve, to either
paying them or making reasonable provision for payment.' ° 9
8. Indemnification
Several sections of article 11, dealing with indemnification of a general
partner, were amended.110 The amendments deal primarily with the
mechanics of determining the permissibility of indemnification and the un-
dertaking required of a general partner before he may obtain advanced pay-
ment of expenses. Also, a new section 11.21 was added to expressly allow a
limited partnership agreement to restrict the circumstances under which in-
demnification is required."'
9. Facsimile Filings
A new section 13.04 was added to allow a certificate or other instrument
authorized to be filed with the secretary of state under TRLPA to be "a
photographic, photostatic, facsimile, or similar reproduction of a signed"
document and to permit any signature to be a facsimile.' 12
106. Id. § 2.13.
107. Id. § 3.03(b).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 8.05.
110. Id. § 11.
112. Id. § 13.21.112. Id. § 13.04.
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